The eVTOL pitch was nearly too simple to mimic for a few years. A silent electric plane glides to JFK in seven minutes after taking off vertically from a Manhattan rooftop. Bankers adored the deck, and investors adored the imagery. Between 2021 and 2023, the industry persuaded itself that certification was merely a formality as SPAC mergers and valuations increased more quickly. It wasn’t. The FAA, which has never been known to act swiftly, took its time. More flight tests, more time spent in wind tunnels, and more attorneys were paid for with funds that were intended to support a glide path to revenue. The pitch remained the same. It was the clock.
It feels more like a slow exhale than a crash right now. Raising a billion, merging, listing, and riding the hype was the early model, but it is no longer effective. The first significant shock was Lilium’s collapse in late 2024. Soon after, Volocopter arrived. Real engineering, real prototypes, and the kind of European patience that is meant to outlive Silicon Valley impatience were all present in both. The cash burn could not be sustained by either. Speaking with those who follow this industry gives the impression that the failures weren’t shocking. They were simply earlier than anticipated.
It’s simple to identify the survivors. Toyota is leaning in behind the Marina, California, production line, while Joby has about $2.6 billion on its balance sheet. After a sizable raise, Archer ended 2025 with nearly $2 billion. Beta. A few others. The figures surrounding them are sobering—Joby alone is predicted to spend more than $340 million in the first half of this year—but they have what most of their rivals lack: runway in the financial sense before they have runway in the actual one.
Scott Kirby followed. The market took notice when United’s CEO publicly expressed safety concerns regarding eVTOLs operating in crowded airport airspace this spring. Although Archer’s agreement with United was always contingent—language tying the entire purchase agreement to FAA certification and “further negotiation” on material terms is buried in the SEC filings—hearing the airline’s CEO speculate that the airspace might not be suitable for these aircraft is quite different. Because Joby’s vertical model is structured differently, investors seem to think Delta is still committed to Joby. Whether United walks is still up in the air. In contrast to six months ago, the optionality is now apparent.
It’s difficult to ignore the changes in funding sources. The level of venture capital has decreased. The U.S. military signing contracts that pay actual cash for actual deliveries, Toyota writing strategic checks, and Delta exercising warrants all resemble the new currency. Although defense work is unglamorous, it generates revenue while the FAA reviews paperwork, so that final category is more important than the press releases indicate. The trade-off is that strategic capital typically seeks conditions, milestones, and control. There were never any restrictions on the easy money. The new currency does.
This will be resolved over the next eighteen months. There will be mergers; smaller companies with intriguing technology and thin balance sheets are precisely the kind of asset that an Airbus or Boeing could discreetly acquire. It’s possible that some of the early SPAC investors will never be able to recover their losses. If Dubai proceeds smoothly, if Los Angeles 2028 truly occurs with air taxis overhead, and if the production curve bends in the proper direction, then others, the patient ones, might still witness something remarkable. The dream is still alive. Taking the long way home is all that’s involved.