The regular schedule of finance committee meetings has been disrupted by the release of the BCG Treasury Benchmarking Survey in mid-April. It’s not precisely the headline figures. For the past three years, CFOs have been gazing at deposit reports and rate curves. It’s more the result of 40 banks in North America and Europe quietly acknowledging that millions of dollars in run-rate contributions are still trapped inside their own balance sheets, waiting on operating models that haven’t quite caught up to the global average.
Treasury served as a guardian for the majority of the post-2008 period. You constructed the buffers, kept an eye on the ratios, and satisfied the regulators. It had a rhythm that was almost comforting. Everyone could more or less expect stress tests by the end of the quarter, Tuesday liquidity coverage ratios, and an annual capital plan. Then came 2022. The assumptions built into deposit models, such as sticky retail balances and predictable corporate flows, began acting more like rumors than facts as rates skyrocketed at a rate that no one under fifty had ever managed.
The realization that the old playbook was never going to translate is captured in the BCG survey in a tone that is more somber than alarming. According to Pascal Vogt and his co-authors, it’s a change from stability and compliance to active balance sheet management. While this may sound neat on paper, it actually entails rebuilding the muscles that most treasury teams haven’t had to use in fifteen years. It’s difficult to ignore how uncomfortable some of the answers are. Approximately 50% of banks acknowledge that they are unable to fully integrate capital, liquidity, and interest rate risk. Spreadsheets are still used for a large portion of optimization work, with analysts switching between disconnected dashboards.
Speaking with those who work close to these functions, it seems that the survey didn’t reveal anything that CFOs weren’t already suspecting. It let them know they weren’t by themselves. That type of data is distinct. The conversation at the boardroom table shifts when 90% of treasurers identify geopolitics—funding markets, counterparty exposure, the tedious process of cross-border resolution constraints—as their primary external pressure. The treasurer is now outlining strategy rather than numbers.
The report falls most heavily on the deposit picture. With an average duration of about 3.2 years, the retail core share, which was predicted to reprice in more than a year, has decreased to about 66%. Small numbers, but they’re not. Multiplying a few basis points of mismatched stickiness across a balance sheet can result in a figure that makes a CFO uncomfortable. Treasurers are aware of this. They’ve known it all along. They now have a benchmark in their inbox that measures their level of exposure in comparison to their peers.
As you observe this, you begin to understand why the phrase “activating the balance sheet” is more significant than it initially implies. Intent is implied by activation. It suggests that the duration profile, the shape of the liability mix, and the deployment of collateral are all chosen with the same consideration that a portfolio manager gives to securities. That is not merely a technological change, but also a cultural one. Additionally, cultural changes within big banks often take longer than anticipated.
It’s still unclear which institutions will take action first and which will hold off until a rival’s performance compels them to do so. The survey makes no precise predictions. It makes maps. However, the map appears to point in a single direction for CFOs who closely examine it: toward treasury desks that are now much harder to ignore, louder, and more analytical than they were in the past.
